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How much longer do you think it will take before [the nation’s climate
researchers] are able to hone [their] conclusions down to some very
simple recommendations, on tangible, specific action programs that are
rational and sensible and cost effective for us to take . . . [and] justified
1
by what we already know?
Clearly, it’s time for some radical ideas about solving global warming.
2
But where’s radical realism when we need it?

The question of what actions on climate change make sense in the
short term—raised in the quotes above—remains largely unanswered.
Until we better organize the climate science and technology enterprise to focus on policy options for the short term, the climate debate
is likely to remain in its present gridlock. Policies that address climate
change—including both mitigation and adaptation—have both longterm and short-term effects. To date, climate policy has focused primarily on the long term, and so too has the research intended to inform that policy. As a consequence, too little attention is paid to policy options and technological alternatives that might make sense in
the short term. One reason for the short term being overlooked is the
intellectual gerrymandering of the climate change issue at the international level, which has maintained a narrow focus on greenhouses
gases (GHGs) and their effects. Billions of dollars of public investments in climate science and technology might be reoriented to better serve the needs of decision makers grappling with climate change,
which will be a policy issue for decades to come, by focusing on policies that make sense in both the short and long terms.
This Article presents a series of seven assertions. First, humancaused climate change is real and requires attention by policy makers
†
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to both mitigation and adaptation—but there is no quick fix. The issue will be with us for decades and longer. Second, any conceivable
emissions reductions policies, even if successful, cannot have a perceptible impact on the climate for many decades. Third, costs (whatever they may be) are consequently borne in the near term, while climate-related benefits are achieved in the distant future. Fourth, many
policies that result in a reduction in emissions also provide benefits in
the short term which are unrelated to climate change. Fifth, adaptation policies can similarly provide immediate benefits. Sixth, climate
policy, particularly international climate policy under the United Na3
tions Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), has
been structured so as to keep policy related to long-term climate
change distinct from policies related to shorter-term issues of energy
policy and adaptation. Seventh, research agendas have followed the
political organization of international climate change policy and have
emphasized the long term, meaning that relatively little attention is
paid to developing specific policy options or near-term technologies
that might be put into place with both short-term and long-term benefits. The climate debate may have slowly begun to reflect these realities, but the research and development community has not yet focused much attention on research to develop policy and technological
options that might be politically viable, cost effective, and practically
feasible.
I. NO QUICK FIX FOR CLIMATE CHANGE
This Article begins by underscoring the scientific consensus presented in assessment of climate change science provided by Working
4
Group I of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).
The IPCC has concluded that GHG emissions resulting from human
activity are an important driver of changes in climate. On this basis
alone, it makes sense to take action to limit GHG emissions. Of
course, the answer to the question of what action should be taken is
not at all straightforward, and involves a number of considerations
(e.g., on what time scale, at what costs, with what consequences, with
what foregone opportunities, etc.). One of the important messages of
the IPCC is that there is no quick fix to issues of climate change. In its
3

See generally United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
[UNFCCC], http://unfccc.int/2860.php (last visited May 1, 2007).
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www.ipcc.ch (last visited May 1, 2007).

2007]

THE CASE FOR A SUSTAINABLE CLIMATE POLICY

1845

third assessment report, the IPCC concluded that “[a]nthropogenic
5
climate change will persist for many centuries.” More recent research has concluded that, even assuming a hypothetical instantaneous curtailment of emissions, the world will continue to experience
some degree of climate change into the future.
Throughout this Article, I use the phrase “climate change” to
mean:
a statistically significant variation in either the mean state of the climate
or in its variability, persisting for an extended period (typically decades
or longer). Climate change may be due to natural internal processes or
external forcings, or to persistent anthropogenic changes in the compo6
sition of the atmosphere or in land use.

I will further use “climate variability” to mean:
variations in the mean state and other statistics (such as standard deviations, the occurrence of extremes, etc.) of the climate on all temporal
and spatial scales beyond that of individual weather events. Variability
may be due to natural internal processes within the climate system (internal variability), or to variations in natural or anthropogenic external
7
forcing (external variability).

Under the IPCC definitions, both climate change and climate
variability have human and non-human elements, and the human
element goes beyond GHGs to include other sources of human influences on the climate system. Clearly explicating these definitions is
important because the FCCC uses a different and much narrower
definition of climate change that is focused only on the marginal ef8
fects of GHG emissions on the climate system. The different definitions profoundly affect climate policy and its relationship to research
and policy, which I will discuss in Part VI.
II. SUCCESSFUL POLICIES WILL HAVE A DELAYED IMPACT
At a 2005 Senate hearing on climate change science and economics, James Hurrell of the United States National Center for Atmospheric Research made a very important observation about the time
scale of the benefits of mitigation policies for altering climate behavior: “it should be recognized that mitigation actions taken now mainly
5

INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, WORKING GROUP I, CLIMATE
CHANGE 2001: THE SCIENTIFIC BASIS 17 (J.T. Houghton et al. eds., 2001).
6
Id. at 787.
7
Id. at 789.
8
See infra Part VI.
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9

have benefits 50 years and beyond now.” Science magazine further
reported in 2005 that “the wheels of global climate change are in motion, and there is little we can do to stop them, at least in the short10
term.” That the long lead time until mitigation can have a perceptible effect on climate systems seems to be well appreciated by many
scientists and policy analysts, but seems to be less well appreciated in
public and political debates over climate policy.
Scientists sometimes tend to skirt around this important point by
talking about “scenarios” for future emissions rather than actual policies that lead to particular scenarios. Such scenarios have an important role in shaping thinking and research on the range of possible
futures. At the same time, it is quite easy to postulate various alternative scenarios for future emissions that lead to discernible changes in
global temperature. It is, of course, similarly easy to discuss various
“rosy” scenarios for global poverty, democracy in Iraq, or the future
state of the deficit. What matters for real-world outcomes are not scenarios of the future, but the concrete, practical policy actions that
lead to outcomes that are distinguishable from outcomes that result
from the implementation of alternative policy actions.
From this perspective, despite all of the bluster about the Kyoto
Protocol, its implementation is more about symbolism and preparation for future policy action than about any significant effect on the
climate system. In 2006, economist William Nordhaus of Yale University wrote that
[t]he Kyoto Protocol is widely seen as somewhere between troubled and
terminal. . . . Even if the current Protocol is extended, models indicate
that it will have little impact on global temperature change. Unless
there is a dramatic breakthrough or a new design, the Protocol threatens
11
to be seen as a monument to institutional overreach.

According to Oxford’s Steve Rayner, the focus on Kyoto has distracted attention from other possible approaches:

9
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http://www.aaas.org/news/releases/2005/0318scipak.shtml. See Gerard A. Meehl et
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Unfortunately, support for Kyoto has become a litmus test for determining those who take the threat of climate change seriously. Between
Kyoto’s supporters and those who scoff at the dangers of leaving greenhouse gas emissions unchecked, there has been a tiny minority of commentators and analysts convinced of the urgency of the problem while
remaining profoundly sceptical of the proposed solution. But their
12
voices have largely gone unheard.

Nordhaus would seem to agree on this point: “Nations are now
beginning to consider the structure of climate-change policies for the
period after 2008-2012. Some countries, states, cities, companies, and
13
even universities are adopting their own climate-change policies.”
Nordhaus then asks: “Are there in fact alternatives to the scheme of
tradable emissions permit [sic] embodied in the Protocol? The fact is
that alterative approaches have not had a serious hearing among
14
natural scientists or among policymakers.”
Experience with the actual practice of emissions reductions indicates that even those countries expressing strong support for reductions face difficulties achieving them in practice. Tim Dyson from the
London School of Economics has offered a sobering view of such climate realism:
[I]n the last decade or so virtually all countries have continued to burn
greater amounts of fossil fuel. This also applies to those that have arguably been most prominent in supporting the Kyoto process—notably
Canada, Japan and those of the [EU]. Many of these countries are
unlikely to meet their CO2 reduction targets agreed under the Kyoto
treaty (which finally came into force in 2005). Thus comparing 1990
and 2002, it is estimated that Canada’s emissions increased by 22% and
Japan’s by 13. While the CO2 emissions of the 15 countries that comprised the EU before 2004 (i.e. the EU15) remained roughly constant,
this was mainly due to reductions in Germany and Britain—both of
which gained fortuitously from a move away from coal towards natural
gas (which emits less CO2 per unit of energy). Of the remaining countries in the EU(15), only Sweden—which relies heavily on hydro and nuclear—registered a fall in CO2 emissions . . . . Of the 36 “Annex B” countries of the Kyoto treaty (i.e. the industrialized countries, including
former eastern bloc nations), only 12 experienced declines in emissions:
the three in the EU(15), plus nine former eastern bloc nations. If one
excludes these, then CO2 emissions among the remaining 24 Annex B
countries rose by 13% during 1990-2002. Of course, the United States,
12

Memorandum from Steve Rayner, Dir., James Martin Inst., Univ. of Oxford, to
the Envtl. Audit Comm. of the House of Commons (Nov. 24, 2007), available at
http://sciencepolicy.colorado.edu/prometheus/archives/EAC%20memo%20fin.doc.
13
Nordhaus, supra note 11, at 1.
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the world’s largest emitter of CO2, is not a signatory to the Kyoto treaty.
And, to complete the list of [predictable social reactions], the “Kyoto
process” . . . [has] involved no shortage of recrimination between repre15
sentatives of the US, the EU, and other countries.

The bottom line is that, with respect to modulating the behavior
of the climate system, current GHG mitigation policies (whether proposed or implemented) are more symbolic than substantive. A focus
on such policies has been recognized by a number of observers as limiting the scope of discussions about alternative policies that might result in greater substantive outcomes. The limited discussion of alternatives has been restricted by advocates for action with assertions that,
despite their flaws, current approaches are merely first steps and that
a discussion of options might diminish political momentum for action. Of course, opponents to action do not wish to discuss policy options in the first place. As discussed in Part VI, action on adaptation
has been a victim of the institutionalization of climate policy, which
demonstrates a strong bias in favor of mitigation over adaptation. But
even with a pace of emissions reductions that seems practically, if not
politically, inconceivable today, such reductions would have little or
no perceptible effect on the climate system for decades.
As a result, more than ever, discussions of new and creative policy
options on climate change that make sense in the short term are
needed in political debate over climate change.
III. NEAR-TERM COSTS AND DISTANT-FUTURE BENEFITS
The reality of the time lag between costs and benefits illustrates
the disingenuousness of using current climate events to justify mitigation action. Even if society takes immediate and drastic action on
emissions, there can be no scientifically valid argument that such actions will lead to a perceptibly better climate in our lifetime. For the
coming decades, the most effective policy responses to climate-related
impacts (such as hurricanes and other disasters or diseases like malaria) will necessarily be adaptive.

15

Tim Dyson, On Development, Demography and Climate Change: The End of the World
as We Know It?, 27 POPULATION & ENV’T 117, 132-33 (2005) (citations omitted); cf.
Pekka E. Kauppi, The United Nations Climate Convention: Unattainable or Irrelevant, 270
SCIENCE 1454, 1454 (1995) (stating presciently that the goal of the UNFCCC to “prevent dangerous . . . interference with the climate system” was either “unattainable or
irrelevant” and that if climate model “projections are right, the climate will change,
there will be dangerous effects, and the Convention objective will be unattainable”).
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The point of this analysis is not to suggest that we throw up our
hands and do nothing to mitigate the effects of climate change. But
the asymmetry in costs and benefits suggests that if meaningful action
is to occur in mitigation, we must think about different strategies and,
in particular, policy options that have greater symmetry between the
timing of costs and benefits.
I fully intend that this perspective be viewed as an alternative to
the two-sided debate that has been caricatured as climate skeptics
against climate alarmists. Perhaps those holding this third position
might be characterized as climate realists.
IV. EMISSIONS-REDUCING POLICIES ALSO PROVIDE SHORT-TERM
BENEFITS UNRELATED TO CLIMATE CHANGE
Observers of climate policy have long recognized that mitigation
actions can provide benefits that extend beyond their effects on the
long-term behavior of the climate system. In 2001, the IPCC Working
Group III on Mitigation argued:
The effectiveness of climate change mitigation can be enhanced when
climate policies are integrated with the non-climate objectives of national and sectorial policy development and be turned into broad transition strategies to achieve the long-term social and technological changes
required by both sustainable development and climate change mitigation. Just as climate policies can yield ancillary benefits that improve
wellbeing, non-climate policies may produce climate benefits. It may be
possible to significantly reduce greenhouse gas emissions by pursuing
16
climate objectives through general socio-economic policies.

Empirical research on communities in the United States that are
taking action to mitigate GHG emissions supports this conclusion.
Consider the following extended excerpt from a study of local initiatives on climate change:
The experience of CCP [Cities for Climate Protection (CCP) campaign
sponsored by the International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives] communities indicates that global climate change is most likely to
be reframed as a local issue when city officials recognise that actions to
control GHG emissions also address other local concerns already on
their agendas. Localisation requires the prior existence of a local hook
on which to hang the issue of global climate change.
Localising global climate change is an important first step in develop-

16

IPCC, WORKING GROUP III, CLIMATE CHANGE 2001: MITIGATION 12 (Bert Metz
et al. eds., 2001) (emphasis omitted).
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ing a municipal response to global warming; it helps generate political
support for reducing local GHG emissions. However, not all communities are able to move from reframing to policy action. There are several
institutional barriers that make it difficult for cities to develop and implement policies and programmes for mitigating climate change: the issue does not fit the way most city governments organise themselves;
many city governments lack the administrative capacity to monitor their
GHG emissions; and there are often budgetary constraints that make it
difficult to invest in emissions reduction activities.
Ultimately, motivating local action to mitigate global climate change
calls for an indirect strategy, focused on the ways in which emissionsproducing activities are embedded in broader community concerns.
The primary benefit of an indirect approach is that it avoids many of the
political debates about climate change science that have plagued international efforts to address this issue. Several officials noted that it really
does not matter whether global climate change science is credible.
Since the emphasis is on how reducing GHG emissions can help the city
address other (more pressing) problems, questions of the scientific basis
for climate change rarely come up. When and if they do, city officials
17
can easily reply that these are actions they should take anyway.

When it comes to effective substantive action on mitigation, research and experience show quite clearly that progress is far more
likely when such actions align a short-term aim with long-term concerns. In practice, this typically means focusing action on the short
term, with the long-term goals taking on secondary importance. Examples of such short-term issues related to mitigation include the
costs of energy, the benefits of reducing reliance on fossil fuels from
the Middle East, the innovation and job-creating possibilities of alternative energy technologies, particulate air pollution, transportation
efficiencies, and so on. This approach to climate change is contrary to
the dominant approach, in which costs and benefits are temporally
18
mismatched.
V. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ADAPTIVE POLICIES
In the coming decades, the only policies that can effectively be
used to manage the immediate effects of climate variability and
change will be adaptive. This conclusion inescapably results from the
fact that any realistic GHG mitigation policies will have no perceptible
17

Michele M. Betsill, Mitigating Climate Change in US Cities: Opportunities and Obstacles, 6 LOCAL ENV’T 393, 404 (2001) (citations omitted), available at http://
www.colostate.edu/Depts/PoliSci/fac/mb/Local%20Environment.pdf.
18
See infra Part VI.
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19

impact on climate behavior for decades and longer. This conclusion
is illustrated in the following Figure, which comes from research on
the relative contributions of societal changes (e.g., population growth
and development) and resultant climate changes on future tropical
20
cyclone damage around the world.
The Figure below illustrates how one dollar in global tropical cyclone damage today will increase by 2050 under one set of assumptions about changing hurricane intensity, societal development, and
21
the relationship between intensity changes and damage.

Segment F indicates that for each $1.00 of impact today (segment
A) there will be an increase in damages of $0.64 due to the increased
19

See supra Part II.
Note that the more general term for a hurricane is a “tropical cyclone.” See Atlantic Oceanographic and Meteorological Laboratory, FAQ: Hurricanes, Typhoons,
and Tropical Cyclones, http://www.aoml.noaa.gov/hrd/tcfaq/A1.html (last visited
May 1, 2007).
21
The Figure assumes that by 2050 all hurricanes will increase in intensity by 18%,
that population and wealth will increase by a combined 2.5% per year, and that hurricane damage increases are proportional to the cube of the increase in wind speed.
The full analysis can be found in Roger A. Pielke, Jr., Future Economic Damage from
Tropical Cyclones: Sensitivities to Societal and Climate Changes, PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL
SOC’Y A. (forthcoming 2007), available at http://sciencepolicy.colorado.edu/admin/
publication_files/resource-2517-2007.14.pdf.
20
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intensity (segment B), $1.80 due to more exposed people and wealth
in coastal locations (segment C), and $1.16 due to the effects of the
increased intensity on the additional people and exposed property
(segment D) in the year 2050. Adding these increments together
($1.00 + $0.64 + $1.80 + $1.16) results in total damages in 2050 of
$4.60 for every $1.00 today.
Several additional assumptions are required to evaluate the relative potential for mitigation and adaptation to reduce this damage. If
we assume that GHG reductions have an instantaneous (i.e., contemporary with the reductions) and a proportional (e.g., a 50% decrease
in emissions results in a 50% decrease in the increase in intensity) ef22
fect on tropical cyclone intensity, then under these assumptions, the
maximum potential effectiveness of a 10% reduction in GHG emissions
through 2050 for reducing future global tropical cyclone damage is
$0.18 (that is, 10% of $1.80) and the maximum potential effectiveness
23
of adaptation is about twenty-six times greater, or $4.60. These conclusions are qualitatively insensitive to the magnitude of the projected
increase in tropical cyclone intensity or population scenarios.
To emphasize: this is not an argument against mitigation. Instead, this simple analysis under the most favorable assumptions for
mitigation indicates that any realistically achievable mitigation policies
can have at best only an imperceptible effect on global tropical cyclone damage in the short term (decades into the future). The same
conclusion holds for other extreme events, and, I would hypothesize,
for the vast majority of society-climate interactions. In fact, I am not
aware of a single study that suggests that there will be significant shortterm benefits of climate mitigation for climate impacts.
This reality explains why adaptation necessarily must be at the
center of climate policy. It also helps to explain why mitigation policies in the short term necessarily must be justified by their nonclimate
benefits.
22

Of course, the real climate system does not work this way and the effects of
mitigation on tropical cyclone behavior remains poorly understood, but the effects are
certainly less direct than in the oversimplification offered here.
23
The maximum potential effectiveness of adaptation is equal to the total costs. If
atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases could instantly be held constant such
that there would be no effect of human-caused climate change on hurricanes, then the
maximum effectiveness of mitigation in this case would be $1.80. In reality, this number is substantially smaller, given the general global commitment to climate change
and the time lag of emissions-reduction effects on the climate system. Of course, the
desirability of particular courses of action will also depend upon a comparison of costs
and benefits.
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VI. ARBITRARY DISTINCTIONS IN CLIMATE POLICY
The climate issue suffers from a bizarre sort of intellectual gerrymandering that has little basis in science or policy. The UNFCC,
which focuses on international policy, and the IPCC, which focuses on
scientific assessments, use different definitions of climate change.
Understanding the effects of the two definitions on the politics of the
climate issue helps one to understand better the current international
stalemate on climate policy—a stalemate that matters because climate
change is real and actions are needed to improve energy policies and
to reduce the vulnerability of people and ecosystems to climate effects.
Part I of this Article explained that Working Group I of the IPCC
has a very broad definition of climate change that includes changes
24
occurring for any reason. By contrast, the FCCC focuses narrowly on
GHG emissions and their consequences. Taken literally, the focus of
the FCCC would necessarily limit attention to the long-term consequences of climate change and the extent to which GHG emissions
drive those consequences. This focus creates a bias against adaptation, because it creates a cost-benefit calculus in which adaptation has
25
only costs and no benefits. The FCCC definition also encourages the
waging of political battles through science, as evidence for the detection and attribution of climate change (and whether it will exceed a
threshold of “dangerous interference” in the climate system under
FCCC Article 2) is necessary as a prerequisite for action under the
FCCC.
Numerous participants and analysts have sought to overcome this
fundamental flaw in the structure of the FCCC by emphasizing the re26
lationships between climate policy and sustainable development.
Some involved in the IPCC have also recognized the importance of
integrating issues of climate change and sustainable development, and
a chapter on the subject is to be included in the next assessment re-

24

By contrast, Working Groups II and III often utilize the FCCC definition of climate change. For further discussion, see Roger A. Pielke, Jr., Misdefining “Climate
Change”: Consequences for Science and Action, 8 ENVTL. SCI. & POL’Y 548, 555-56 (2005).
25
The logic behind costs without benefits is that without the marginal influence of
GHG-induced effects on the climate system, such adaptation would be, by definition,
unnecessary.
26
See, e.g., Richard J.T. Klein et al., Integrating Mitigation and Adaptation into Climate
and Development Policy: Three Research Questions, 8 ENVTL. SCI. & POL’Y 579, 588 (2005).
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27

port in 2007. Nonetheless, I remain skeptical that such efforts will
do much to alter the generally narrow intellectual approach to the
28
FCCC, which is reflected throughout the IPCC.
The narrow focus of the FCCC helps to explain why we see so
many supposedly scientific debates related to the detection of climate
changes and attribution of those changes to anthropogenic GHGs,
29
such as the ongoing battle over the infamous “hockey stick” graph.
Given the emphasis placed upon detection and attribution, it is not
too much of an exaggeration to observe that many proponents of action on emissions reductions want to characterize every climate event
or trend as the result of human-caused climate change, whereas opponents of action on emissions reductions want to cast as much doubt
as possible on such claims. We have seen a perfect example of this
dynamic in public debates over hurricanes and climate change over
the past few years as the science of hurricanes became almost instantaneously caught up in the politics of the global warming debate.
The effect of the intense politicization of climate change has been
to preclude most reasoned discussion of innovative or new policy options on climate change. Most of the focus instead is on empty exhortations of support for “action” or claims of “too much uncertainty.”
Such expressions may be emotionally satisfying, but do little to move
the political debate forward in any meaningful way. With strong public support for action on climate change, the lack of meaningful alternatives continuously set forth in public debate sets the stage for what
Tim Dyson has called a recipe for only marginal action:
[T]he prospects for an enforceable international agreement that will
bring about a sustained and significant reduction in annual global CO2
emissions are very poor. While it may be in the interest of the world as a
whole to restrict the burning of fossil fuels, it is in the interest of individual countries to avoid making such changes . . . . Moreover, the enormous complexities involved . . . will also hinder agreement. Doubtless
there will be gains in energy use efficiency, shifts towards less carbon in-

27

REPORT OF THE JOINT IPCC WORKING GROUP II & III EXPERT MEETING ON THE
INTEGRATION OF ADAPTATION, MITIGATION AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT INTO THE
4TH IPCC ASSESSMENT REPORT (2005), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/am-sd.pdf.
28
As a practical matter, discourse on climate policy reinforces the intellectual gerrymandering through new concepts, such as “mainstreaming,” which preserve rather
than move beyond the status quo. See Roger A. Pielke, Jr. et al., Climate Change 2007:
Lifting the Taboo on Adaptation, 445 NATURE 597 (2007).
29
For differing opinions on this issue, see Real Climate, http://
www.realclimate.org (last visited May 1, 2007), and Climate Audit, http://
climateaudit.org (last visited May 1, 2007).
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tensive fuels, and greater use of renewable energy sources (e.g. solar,
biomass, wind and tidal power). But except for a massive shift towards
nuclear . . . there are limits to what such changes could possibly achieve
in terms of CO2 reduction. Other technological ideas—like the extraction of CO2 from coal and its sequestration underground . . . or, still
more, the development of the so-called “hydrogen economy”—are remote, ideas as large scale and significant solutions to the problem . . . .
Indeed, such notions can themselves be regarded as providing some basis of avoidance inasmuch as they suggest that something is being done.
Understandably, poor countries are unlikely to put great effort into constraining their CO2 emissions—especially in the face of massive discrepancies between themselves and the rich.
In sum, . . . for the foreseeable future the basic response to global
30
warming will be one of avoidance and, at most, marginal change.

A 2006 National Journal poll on the perspectives of members of
Congress on climate science and policy supports focusing on short31
term policy issues to reduce GHG emissions. The poll asked, “Do
you think it’s been proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the Earth
is warming because of man-made pollution?” Interestingly, 98% of
Democrats replied “Yes,” while only 23% of Republicans replied
32
“Yes.” But it should not be overlooked that, even with the party divisions, a clear majority of members of the Republican-led 109th Congress believed that global warming is real and is caused by humans. If
the poll numbers accurately reflected Congressional perspectives in
the 109th Congress, then 55 members of the Senate and 251 members
of the House believed that “it’s been proven beyond a reasonable
33
doubt that the Earth is warming because of man-made pollution.”
With the political change in the leadership of the 110th Congress,
there seems to be evidence that there is exceedingly little value left in
continuing to argue the science of this particular question. Clearly,
there are other factors at play here beyond “skepticism” that shape
how decision makers act on climate change. Efforts to educate Con-

30

Dyson, supra note 15, at 133-34.
Inside Washington: Congressional Insiders Poll, NAT’L J., Apr. 1, 2006, at 5-6.
32
Id. at 5. Interestingly, as has been found in many areas, the views of members of
Congress are more ideologically determined by their party membership than those of
the general population. In opinion polls of the public asking a similar question, neither Democrats nor Republicans show such unanimity of opinion. Gallup Org., Americans Still Not Highly Concerned About Global Warming, GALLUP POLL, Apr. 7, 2006, available at http://poll.gallup.com/content/?ci=22291. This may be a consequence of the
effects of the gerrymandering of Congressional districts, which has often been criticized as generating a legislature that is more ideological than its constituents.
33
Inside Washington, supra note 31, at 5.
31
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gress on the reality of climate change are, in my view, completely
wasted on a majority of the convinced.
The 2006 National Journal poll asks a second question: “Which of
these actions to reduce pollution could you possibly support?” The
answers included five options—mandatory limits on carbon dioxide
emissions, increased spending on alternative fuels, greater reliance on
nuclear energy, higher fuel-efficiency standards for automobiles, and
34
a higher gasoline tax. For each of these issues, except a gasoline tax
(which is not favored by members of either party), there is far more
agreement in support of action than there is on the question of sci35
ence. And, in each case, there is evidence of enough support to suggest that bipartisan agreement might be reached on particular policy
options. The devil is, of course, in the details, but this poll shows that
debate on climate policy might advance more quickly if framed in
terms of policy options, and not science. There is ample evidence that
there is room for compromise across partisan boundaries, without
turning Republicans into Democrats or vice versa.
The nation awaits politically creative policy options that can navigate the complicated set of interests of 535 members of Congress. All
of the precursors for such action are in place, except for the politically
creative options. Efforts to debate the science are simply misplaced in
such a context. Die-hard partisans will no doubt come up with a
range of excuses as to why they cannot compromise, and will gravitate
back to the science as a comfortable home for maintaining the present debate. Such partisans typically point the finger of blame at their
political opponents, though they should be looking in the mirror.
VII. OVEREMPHASIS BY THE RESEARCH COMMUNITY ON THE LONG TERM
AND THE NEED TO FOCUS ON PRACTICAL POLICIES
In 1994, I argued that the U.S. Global Change Research Program
(USGCRP) was “likely [to] produce ‘good science,’” but would be
unlikely to deliver “usable information” to policy makers, as had been
36
called for in the legislation that created the program. I wrote that
instead of having a long-term focus on large-scale climate change, the
USGCRP could “distill[] the practical significance of scientific information, and at the same time develop a wide range of action alterna34
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tives to address the range of problems.” The USGCRP and its successor, the Climate Change Science Program, have never placed the
needs of decision makers at the center of their mission, focusing instead on advancing scientific understanding. Part of the explanation
for this situation lies in the fact that the scientific community has
benefited immensely from the current approach, and an emphasis on
short-term policy and technological options would necessarily imply a
different approach to climate science and technology policy priori38
ties.
I am convinced that as people begin to see the limited performance of existing approaches to emissions reductions, and as the toll of
climate-related disasters grows due to ever-increasing vulnerabilities,
there will be a shift to a more short-term-focused approach to climate
mitigation and adaptation. However, given the institutional and political momentum that currently characterizes the climate issue, there
is a substantial risk that the issue will continue to be dominated by
sound and fury with most action being symbolic or simply ineffectual.
The question is whether we can organize our intellectual infrastructure to invent and bring forward policy and technological options that
will satisfy both the short-term and long-term facets of this incredibly
complex issue. Through oversight of the Climate Change Science
Program and Climate Change Technology Program, Congress might
motivate the evolution of these programs to focus more explicitly on
the needs of decision makers. Until this is done, we should expect
climate policy to simply muddle along.
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